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I . INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982
(FMFIA) requires department and agency managers to identify
internal control and accounting system weaknesses that can
lead to fraud, waste and abuse in government operations. The
issue of implementing an effective internal control program
in the Navy is very important. With increasing public
scrutiny over the misuse of government assets, Navy managers
will need to become more concerned with obtaining and
utilizing resources effectively and efficiently in
accomplishing their objectives. One means to achieving these
objectives is an effective internal control program. The
FMFIA provides an important impetus to restoring public
confidence in the management of the government. In its
current implementation of the Act, the Navy has made a
concerted effort to comply with the Act's spirit and letter,
and has made some progress in greater organizational
coverage and more effective internal control evaluations.
Implementation of an effective internal control program in
the Navy to meet the objectives of the FMFIA has not been
smooth sailing for the Navy and other federal agencies as
they have encountered numerous implementation problems. The
purpose of this thesis is to review and evaluate the Navy's
Progress in implementing the FMFIA including discussion of
past implementation problems and to identify areas for
improvement that managers can use to help them with the
internal control process.
B. BACKGROUND
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 required the head
of each department and agency to establish and maintain
adequate systems of internal control.
With growing concern over numerous publicized cases of
government mismanagement of resources, Congress amended the
Budget and Accounting Act via the FMFIA to require ongoing
evaluations and reports on the adequacy of the system of
internal controls. The Act further requires federal managers
to correct the weaknesses and report annually to the
President and the Congress on their programs. The FMFIA also
required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
consult with the Comptroller General of the United States to
establish guidelines for these evaluations and reports.
OMB revised the already established government policy on
internal control and assigned management the responsibility
of establishing, maintaining, reviewing and improving
internal control systems in each agency.
Unfortunately, the Navy has experienced implementation
difficulties with the FMFIA. Some of the implementation
problems encountered by the Navy include initial lack of
10
guidance from the headquarters level, no training for line
managers on how to perform required reviews, significant
resistance from line managers to complete required reviews
and the significant amount of time and paperwork burden
associated with the entire management control review
process
.
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The objective of this thesis is to examine and evaluate
the Department of the Navy's progress in implementing the
Act. The history and evolution of internal control in the
Federal Government and an overview of the current internal
control evaluation system will be reviewed.
This thesis then presents the research effort by first
presenting a history of the Navy's internal control program,
a review of the Navy's financial management structure and
accounting systems weaknesses. Then the problems experienced
by the Navy in implementing an effective internal control
program are discussed. This is followed by examining the
solutions to the implementation problems as well as the
shortcomings of these solutions.
Finally, the conclusion is reached that there are ways
to improve the process, such as improving direction and
coordination in the Act's implementation, emphasizing
alternatives to internal control reviews, focusing efforts
on high risk areas, improving management training and using
a checklist approach to completing the required reviews.
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The research consisted of telephone interviews to
solicit any innovative ideas to improve implementation of
the Act. In addition, a detailed search and evaluation was
made of the literature in the area of internal control
systems and the GAO audits of the Navy's progress in
implementation of the Act.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS CHAPTERS
Chapter II provides a discussion on the background of
the Federal Government's internal control system. This
includes a discussion of the Budget and Accounting Act of
1950, OMB Circular A-123, the FMFIA, and the GAO standards
for internal controls in the Federal Government.
Chapter III examines the internal control evaluation
system. This chapter covers the DOD internal control
evaluation process, including performing vulnerability
assessments and management control reviews.
Chapter IV details the history of the Navy's Internal
Control Program, the Navy's financial management structure
and accounting systems weaknesses, and covers the
implementation problems the Navy has experienced in
implementing their internal control program.
Chapter V details the Navy's implementation problems
solutions and the shortcomings of those solutions.
Chapter VI provides a summary along with some
conclusions about and recommendations for further
implementation of the FMFIA.
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II . INTERNAL CONTROL IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 19 50
The Budget and Accounting Act was passed in 1950 and
required that each agency head establish and maintain
systems of accounting and internal control. The passage of
the produced high expectations that these systems of
accounting and internal control would help reduce or prevent
fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement in Federal Government
operations. Unfortunately, development of effective systems
has been slow and numerous situations continue to appear in
the news headlines which show lack of fiscal responsibility,
such as instances of fraud, waste and abuse continue to
occur at unacceptable levels.
B. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A-123
One reason given for the ineffectiveness of the Budget
and Accounting Act was its lack of enforcement. Although
the Act was understood as the current standards of internal
standards of internal control, it did not provide specific
guidance on internal control systems or require mandatory
reports on the quality of those systems.
To give the Act more teeth, OMB issued Circular A-123
in October 1981 as an early effort to improve controls. The
Circular required the head of each department and agency to
develop and maintain adequate systems of internal control.
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Unlike the 1950 Act, however, it defined requirements and
responsibilities in order to transform the 1950 Act's
expectations and enforcement into reality.
The purpose of A-123 is to prescribe policies and
procedures to be followed by executive departments and
agencies in establishing, maintaining, evaluating,
improving, and reporting on internal controls in their
program and administrative activities (ref. l:p.l).
Congress also saw the need for effective internal
management in the Federal Government. The pressure for
Congress to act to force improvement in the government
agencies' internal management was fueled by the numerous
headlines of fraud, waste and abuse in federal activities
and programs, eroding public conf idence,and the government's
inability to operate effectively. Continuing concern over
the poor condition of government internal control and
accounting systems led the Congress to pass the Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-255).
C. FEDERAL MANAGERS' FINANCIAL INTEGRITY ACT OF 1982
This Act requires that agency heads annually report to
the President and the Congress as to whether their internal
accounting and administrative control systems comply with
the Comptroller General's internal control standards and
provide reasonable assurance that:
obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable
law;
14
funds, property and other assets are saf eguarded;and
— revenues and expenditures are properly recorded and
accounted for (ref. 2:p.2).
The Act requires that each agency evaluate its internal
control system in accordance with guidelines prescribed by
OMB and report annually any material internal control
weaknesses together with plans for correction. The annual
report must also indicate whether or not the agency's
accounting system conforms to the Comptroller General's
accounting requirements.
The Act directed that the evaluation and reporting
requirements be implemented in two steps. The first step
was the preparation of guidelines for the evaluation of
internal and administrative controls by OMB in consultation
with the Comptroller General by December 31,1982. The second
step required commencement of annual reporting by the
agencies by December 31, 1983.
D. STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERMENT
To satisfy the first step, it was necessary to define
what was meant by internal control. The American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has made a
distinction between internal accounting controls and
administrative controls. Administrative controls are
concerned with the decision processes leading to
management's authorization of transactions. This
authorization is the starting point for establishing
15
internal accounting control of transactions. Internal
accounting controls are concerned with safeguarding of
assets and reliability of financial records. Given
the AICPA definitions of administrative and internal
accounting controls, the Federal Government needed to
develop standards for internal controls. OMB requested GAO
to develop these standards. GAO reponded by publishing
STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT in
1983. This document, which has come to be known as the
"green book" was derived from the professional standards
established by the AICPA and includes the following concept
of internal controls which is useful in understanding and
applying the internal control standards: "The plan of
organization and methods and procedures adopted by
management to ensure that resource use is consistent with
laws, regulations and policies; that resources are
safeguarded against waste, loss, and misuse; and that
reliable data are obtained, maintained, and fairly disclosed
in reports." (ref. 3:p.l)
What is an internal control standard? GAO defines it as:
"the minimum level of quality acceptable for internal
control systems in operation and constitute the criteria
against which systems are to be evaluated." (ref.3:p.2) The
definition adds that these standards apply to all functional
areas, not the financial or accounting areas. Each area
has some inherent internal controls in the form of
16
instructions mission and performance requirements and
program objectives.
The "green book" breaks the standards for internal
control into three areas: general standards, specific
standards, and the audit resolution standard.
1 . General Standards of Internal Control
GAO lists five general standards of internal
control which apply to all aspects of internal controls,
a. Reasonable Assurance
"Internal control systems are to provide
reasonable assurance that the objectives of the systems will
be accompl ished . " ( re f . 3 : p . 4 ) The term "reasonable assurance"
is inherently subjective, difficult to define and requires
judgment to be exercised. The concept of reasonable
assurance recognizes that internal controls must be cost-
beneficial. That is, the cost of internal control should not
exceed the benefit derived. A cost here refers to the
financial measure of resources consumed in accomplishing a
specified purpose. The benefit derived from a control refers
to the reduction in risk from failing to achieve the
objective of the control. Because the benefit is often not
precisely quantifiable, it is more difficult to define and
determine, and decisions must depend on estimates and
judgments by management. To increase the amount of control
in an area usually will result in an increase in cost.
Therefore, the judgment required to be performed with each
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control is whether the cost of the control exceeds the
benefits derived.
b. Supportive Attitude
"Managers and employees are to maintain and
demonstrate a positive and supportive attitude toward
internal controls at all times." (ref.3:p.4) Line management
commitment to achieving effective internal controls is vital
to the success of achieving the intent of this standard.
This standard requires agency managers and employees to be
attentive to internal control matters and to take steps to
promote the effectiveness of the controls. The bottom line
here is that overall leadership is critical to maintaining a
positive and supportive attitude toward internal controls.
This is accomplished through training, motivating employees
and encouraging management improvement suggestions.
c. Competent Personnel
"Managers and employees are to have personal
and professional integrity and are to maintain a level of
competence that allows them to accomplish their assigned
duties, as well as understand the importance of developing
and implementing good internal controls." (ref. 3:p.5)
Managers and their staffs are required to maintain and
demonstrate their personal and professional integrity, a
skill level necessary to ensure effective performance and a
sufficient understanding of internal controls to effectively
discharge their responsibilities. Professional integrity
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can be promoted or strengthened through an operative code of
conduct. In addition, staffing decisions should include
verification of minimum education and skill requirements.
In the Federal Government this is a severe
limitation. Therefore, training programs are required.
Performance appraisals should also include an assessment of
the manager's implementation and maintenance of effective
internal controls. Managers who possess a good
understanding of internal controls are vital to effective
control systems, and these managers should be used in
formal and on-the-job training programs,
d. Control Objectives
"Internal Control objectives are to be
identified or developed for each agency activity and
are to be logical, applicable, and reasonably complete."
(ref.3:p.6) The purpose of this standard is that the
control objectives are tailored to the agency for each
of its operations. Usually, all operations of an agency
are grouped into cycles that are compatible with the
agency's division of responsibilities. Some agencies collect
cash, others do not; some pay out cash; some are more
administrative in nature; and some are more program and less
financially oriented. Examples of cycles include financial,
administrative, agency management and program (operational)
cycles. These cycles interact and controls over their
interaction must be establ ished . To comply with this
19
standard, an agency must identify and analyze each cycle to
determine the internal control objectives. These objectives
can then be used to evaluate the agency's internal controls,
e. Control Techniques
"Internal control techniques are to be
effective and efficient in accomplishing their internal
control objectives." (ref.3:p.7) The final general standard
requires that the techniques of control are effective and
efficient. Internal control techniques are the mechanisms by
which control objectives are achieved. These techniques are
policies, procedures, organizational plans and physical
layouts. Control techniques must insure that the objective
is met with a high degree of assurance within cost
limitations. All control techniques should be reviewed
periodically and evaluated as to their effectiveness and
efficiency and be modified as required. Effectiveness means
that the techniques fulfill their intended purpose.
Efficiency means that the techniques are designed to provide
maximum benefit with minimum effort. For example, adding
more personnel to the internal control process may improve
the effectiveness of techniques but not necessarily the
e f f ic iency
.
2 . Specif ic Standards of I nternal Control
A number of techniques are essential to providing
the greatest assurance that the internal control objectives
are achieved. There are six critical specific standards.
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a. Documentation
"Internal control systems and all transactions
and other significant events are to be clearly documented,
and the documentation is to be readily available for
examination." (ref.3:p.8) Basically, this standard requires
that agencies document their internal control objectives,
techniques and accountability systems and also document all
pertinent aspects of transactions and other significant
events of an agency. This documentation can be in a variety
of forms, including policy manuals, management directives or
flowcharts of transactions. Complying with the documentation
standard requires that the documentation of internal control
systems and transactions and other significant events be
purposeful and useful to managers in controlling their
operations and also provides auditors with a guide for their
review.
b. Recording of Transactions and Events
"Transactions and other significant events are
to be promptly recorded and properly classified."
(ref.3:p.9) This standard applies to the entire life
cycle of a transaction and includes initiation and
authorization, all aspects of the transaction while in
process and its final classification in summary records.
This standard also provides management with the information
it needs to control operations and provides summary records
from which reports are prepared and for internal review and
21
audits. Failure to adhere to this standard can result in a
loss of information if transactions are not recorded or are
misclass i f ied . Also, if the information is untimely the
agency's reports can be erroneous.
c. Execution of Transactions and Events
"Transactions and other significant events are
to be authorized and executed only by persons acting within
the scope of their authority." (ref.3:p.9) The purpose of
this standard is to assure that only valid transactions and
other events are entered into. Organizations must have clear
lines of authority for certain decisions such as cash
payments. Independent evidence should be maintained so that
proper authorizations are issued and so that the
transactions conform with the terms of the authorizations.
Authorization must be clearly understood by all persons
concerned and specific conditions of authorization must be
clear to ensure compliance with this standard.
d. Separation of Duties
"Key duties and responsibilities in
authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing
transactions should be separated among individuals."
(ref.3:p.l0) No one individual should control all key
aspects of a transaction or event. The primary factor for
deciding when to separate duties is if the performance of
duties by one person would allow that person to commit fraud
or abuse the system. Duties and responsibilities should be
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assigned to a number of individuals to ensure effective
checks and balances exist. One major area to watch in this
area is collusion, because collusion can reduce or destroy
the effectiveness of this standard. Unfortunate ly, collus ion
is very hard to discover since it involves two or more
individuals .
e . Supervis ion
"Qualified and continuous supervision is to be
provided to ensure that internal control objectives are
achieved." (ref.3:p.l0) This requires supervisors to
continuously monitor the work of their employees and ensure
they receive proper training and direction. The assignment,
review and approval of employees' work includes
communicating the duties and responsibilities clearly,
periodic review of performance and approval of work at
critical points to ensure timely completion. This standard
ties together internal controls and can prevent weaknesses
such as collusion from occurring. Supervision is a subset of
operational control and is generally concerned with the day
to day operations of the organization. Mautz and White say
supervision is designed to provide reasonable assurance
that employees utilize and conserve the activity's
resources and do not undertake actions detrimental to the
accomplishment of stated objectives ( ref . 4
:
p . 15 ) . The process
involves managers who get things done by working with
others instead of continuously monitoring personnel actions.
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f. Access to and Accountability for Resources
" Access to resources and records is to be
limited to authorized individuals, and accountability for
the custody and use of resources is to be assigned and
maintained. Periodic comparison shall be made of the
resources with the recorded accountability to determine
whether the two agree. The frequency of the comparison
shall be a function of the vulnerability of the asset."
(ref.3:p.ll) The basic concept behind this standard is to
restrict access to resources. This will help reduce the
risk of fraud, waste or abuse of assets. Some assets, (e.g.,
cash and pilferable material) are more vulnerable to fraud,
waste or abuse than others. This is because of factors such
as cost, portability, exchangeability, and the perceived
risk of loss or improper use of the resources. Each agency
must evaluate its resources and establish control
commensurate with these factors that provide reasonable
assurance that these resources are safeguarded.
3 . Aud it Resolut ion Standard
a. Prompt resolution of audit findings
"Managers are to promptly evaluate findings and
recommendations reported by auditors, determine proper
actions in response to audit findings and recommendations,
and complete, within established timeframes, all actions
that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to
management's attention." (ref.3:p.l2)
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The process of resolving audit findings begins when
the audit results are presented to management and is
completed when actions have been taken to correct the
identifed deficiencies, produce improvements or demonstrate
the audit findings are either invalid or do not warrant
management action.
E. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act, OMB Circular A-123 and the GAO Standards for
Internal Controls in the Federal Government has been
progressing, although not as quickly as was expected.
However, the requirement for implementation and evaluation of
these controls is real.
The standards for internal control must be understood
by the personnel implementing and evaluating these systems.
Nevertheless, these are broad guidelines which management
must tailor to meet its own specific organization.
Based on our discussion of the standards of internal
in the Federal Government, we will next discuss the system
of internal control evaluation the Navy is using to
implement the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982 and to comply with the requirements of the Act.
25
Ill . OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
Once Congress passed the Federal Managers' Financial
Integrity Act of 1982, it became a requirement for each
agency to conduct evaluations of their systems of internal
control. OMB developed and revised Circular A-123 to issue
guidelines for the evaluation of internal controls. These
guidelines have been expanded to include not only accounting
controls but also administrative controls.
Accounting controls safeguard assets and assure
reliability of the financial records. Accounting controls
in one form or another are also employed in other
nonfinancial functions (e.g., supply, personnel and property
management). Administrative controls provide the
organizational structure, policies and procedures through
which goals and missions are achieved and coordination is
maintained. They are designed to assure adherence to
applicable regulations and policies. The Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Navy have used the
OMB guidance in developing the system currently used to
evaluate internal controls in their agencies.
The entire internal control evaluation process must be
understood before one can do evaluations and analyze the
results. An eight element internal management control
26
program must be developed by each DOD component in
accordance' with DOD Directive 5010. 38A (ref.5:p.4). The
eight elements are:
1. Organizing the internal management control process
2. Segmenting the components into assessable units
3. Conducting vulnerabilty assessments on those units
4. Developing plans for subsequent action
5. Conducting internal management control reviews or
other appropriate management actions
6. Scheduling and taking corrective action
7. Providing for quality control
8. Preparing reports.
This chapter will focus on this process.
B. ORGANIZING THE PROCESS
One of the most critical aspects of the entire internal
control process is organizing the evaluation process.
Organizing the internal management control process includes
assigning responsibilities and providing personnel for
planning, directing, and controlling the program; developing
internal reporting and tracking capabilities; maintaining
documentation; and scheduling evaluations. This organization
effort provides the framework that ensures that evaluation





The head of the agency is required to submit a
statement on the status of the agency's internal controls.
However, the preparation of this statement must be delegated
down to senior agency officials to ensure that the process
of evaluating and reporting on internal controls is in
accordance with promulgated guidelines. These senior
officials are charged with the responsibility to provide the
agency head with written assurances that the program was
carried out in an efficient and effective manner.
The assignment of responsibilities should include
one senior official to oversee the entire process. This
senior official oversees the organizational units and these
in turn oversee the heads of individual activities. This
process should be organized down to the lowest level of
responsibility that is feasible for the efficient operation
of the process
.
In addition / the Inspector General, internal audit or
internal review personnel can be of great help in the




Providing Personnel for the Program
It is essential that a sufficient level of staff
support and resources be committed to the process for
planning, directing, and controlling. It is highly likely
that most of these personnel will have little or no
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experience in evaluating internal controls. Therefore, it is
essential that, if the process is to be successful, some
specific measures are considered such as orientation
and training, supervision, technical assistance, monitoring
to assure the reviews are performed adequately, and
individual appraisal of their performance. Personnel
involved in the process should be advised that this will be
a factor in their overall performance evaluation.
3
.
Developing Internal Reporting and Track ing
Capabi 1 i ties
An internal reporting and tracking system must be
established to ensure that the evaluation process is
performed in a timely manner. The system at a minimum
should include reporting and tracking of vulnerability
assessments, internal management control reviews and, most
importantly, corrective actions to be taken on a timely
basis. The system should also be able to provide information
to support preparation of the agency's required annual
statement and the gathering of information on actions
necessary to improve internal controls.
4 Ma i ntaining Documentat ion
Adequate documentation must be maintained. All
documentation connected with the process of conducting
vulnerability assessments, internal management control
reviews and follow-up action should be kept to provide a
record on what was done and who performed the duties. This
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information will also be valuable for reviewing the validity
of conclusions reached, evaluation of performance of
individuals performing the reviews and an audit trail for
future assessments.
5 . Schedul ing Evaluations
The scheduling of evaluations is driven by the
Circular A-123 requirements. The process should be scheduled
to insure that all reviews are completed in time to support
the preparation of the agency's annual statement. In
completing the requirement, items such as the cyclical
nature of operations, availability of personnel and resource
availability should be taken into account.
C. SEGMENTING THE AGENCY
DOD guidance requires that inventories of assessable
units shall be established by segmenting the component into
organizational, functional, programmatic, or other
appropriate subdivisions suitable for evaluating systems of
internal management controls, and identifying program and
administrative activities of appropriate nature and size to
facilitate a meaningful assessment. The resulting listing of
assessable units shall be reviewed annually for changes.
In developing the listing of assessable units,
reference should be made to sources of information such as
organization charts, procedure manuals, the agency's budget,
and program management information systems.
30
Two important factors should be considered when
segmenting the agency. First, the segmentation should
include the lowest level of responsibility feasible. Second,
segmentation of the agency must provide for the systematic
evaluation and reporting of internal control systems.
D. CONDUCTING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS
A vulnerability assessment is a review of the
susceptibility of all the programs listed in the
segmentation process to the occurrence of waste, loss,
unauthorized use or misappropriation. The vulnerability
assessments do not identify or evaluate the effectiveness
of internal controls; they only establish the potential for
loss .
Each agency conducts its own vulnerability
assessments. They are performed by all levels of management
including the lowest possible responsible level as
determined by the segmentation process.
The vulnerability assessment consists of three
steps: (1) analysis of the general control environment, (2)
analysis of inherent risk, and (3) preliminary evaluation of
safeguards. Completion of these three steps is then
summarized, allowing the assessor to make an overall
assessment of the units. The three steps of a vulnerability
assessment will be covered below.
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1 . Analys is o£ the General Control Environment
The environment of an activity has a major influence
on the vulnerability of a program. There are several factors
which influence the environment, including:
- Management Att i tude - Management recognition of the
importance of and commitment to the establishment
and maintenance of a strong system of internal control
as communicated to employees through actions and words.
- Qrganizat ional Structure - The identification of
organizational units to perform the necessary functions
and the establishment of appropriate reporting
relationships
.
- Personnel - The competence and integrity of the
organization's personnel.
- Deleqat ion and Commun icat ion of Author i ty and
Respons ibi 1 i ty - Appropriate delegation or limitation of
authority in a manner that provides assurance that
responsibilities are effectively discharged.
- Policies and Procedures -The definition, documentation
and dissemination of information to all employees as
to how the organization is intended to perform in
various situations.
- Budgeting and Report ing Pract ices - The specification
and communication of organizational goals and the
extent of their accomplishment.
- Organizational Checks and Balances - The establishment
of an appropriate level of financial and other
management controls and internal auditing.
- Automated Data Process ing ( ADP ) Cons iderat ion - When
utilized, an awareness of the strengths and exposures
inherent in a system that uses ADP and the existence of
appropriate controls.
The analysis of the general control environment
should be performed throughout the agency. It is the first
step in the vulnerability assessment process. The analysis
can be performed either as a whole or individually for each
3 2
component. It should be performed by determining whether or
not the characteristics of a strong control environment
exists by reviewing policies and procedures, interviewing
appropriate management personnel, observing daily practices
and by gaining a familiarity with the operations.
2
.
Analysis of Inherent Risk
The second step in the vulnerability assessment
process is to perform an analysis of the inherent potential
risk for waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation
due to the nature of the activity. This assessment is
performed to determine those programs with higher risk as
those programs generally require more control. Some factors
to be considered in performing this analysis are:
- Purpose and characteristics of the program
- Budget level allocated to the program
- Impact of the program outside the agency
- Age and expected life of the program
- The degree of centralization of the program
- Special concerns of the program
- Prior reviews of the program
- Management responsiveness within the program
3 Pre 1 iminar y Evaluat ion of Safeguards
The third step in the vulnerability assessment
process is the making of a preliminary evaluation by the
reviewer on the existence and adequacy of internal controls
over the programs. An important consideration is whether
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adequate controls are in place to minimize or prevent
waste, loss unauthorized use, or misappropriation. This is
not an in-depth review of internal controls, but an
assessmenmt by the reviewer of the existence and functioning
of current controls.
4 . S umma rizinq the Results of the Vulnerabi 1 i ty
Assessments
After completing the three steps of the
vulnerability assessment process 7 the reviewer can summarize
the results and make an overall assessment of the adherence
of the program's internal control system to the prescribed
standards and the vulnerability of the program to
waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation. This
information allows management to develop a plan for
conducting the internal control review process.
E. CONDUCTING INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONTROL REVIEWS
Once the vulnerability assessments have been completed
and summarized, plans and schedules for internal management
control reviews or other actions shall be developed based on
a ranking of the assessable units' vulnerability.
An internal management control review is a detailed
examination of an assessable unit to ensure internal
controls exist, are in place, documented and functioning as
intended. These in-depth reviews should identify weak, non-
existent or excessive controls and initiate actions
necessary to correct them.
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Internal management control reviews shall include the
following six steps:
1. Identification of event cycles
2. Analysis of the general control environment
3. Documentation of the event cycles
4. Evaluation of internal controls within the event cycles
5. Testing the internal controls
6. Reporting the results.
1 . Ident i f icat ion of Event Cycles
The first step of this process breaks down each
program into their respective event cycles. An event cycle
is basically a series of related steps within a program that
are held together by significant beginning and end points.
Generally accepted auditing standards usually segment event
cycles into the following categories: sales and collections,
acquisition and payment, payroll and personnel, inventory
and warehousing and capital acquisition and repayment. Most
programs have many event cycles and each event cycle
represents an area that should be examined for internal
controls. An example of an event cycle for administration
would be a payroll department. The cycle begins with proper
authorization of employment, pay computed using only valid
time cards, proper withholding of taxes, segregation of
duties for personnel processing checks and those
distributing them. Another example of an event cycle within
an activity publishing directives would include gathering
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information, writing a draft, transcribing editing
circulating for comments, revising, transcribing in final
format, publishing, distributing and updating. Once all the
events for a particular program are identified, a
determination is made as to their vulnerability to risk. The
source of information for this is the results of the
vulnerability assessments. The judgment of the person
performing the review can also be used. It is important to
maintain all documentation relating to this process to
provide future reviewers with an audit trail.
2
.
Review of the General Control Environment
The environment in which the event cycle operates
has a major impact on the effectiveness of internal
controls. An important part of the internal management
control review is an evaluation of the general control
environment listed earlier. Analysis of the general control
environment performed for the vulnerability assessment can




Documentat ion of the Event Cycles
The reviewer of an event cycle must thoroughly
understand each part of the event cycle. This understanding
is accomplished through completely documenting the cycle.
This is particularly important when the person preparing the
documentation is not the reviewer. The documentation can be
in the form of a narrative description or a flowchart with a
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narrative description. Documenting the event cycle is
accomplished through reviewing past documentation and
interviewing personnel involved in the cycle. The
documentation should include such things as procedures
followed; interviewing personnel performing the procedures
and examining the forms and records developed and
maintained. Additionally, the reviewer should examine the
documentation with personnel involved in the cycle to ensure
it accurately reflects the cycle correctly. Also a small
number of transactions may be traced through the cycle. Both
of these procedures will ensure the documentation and the
understanding of the event cycle are accurate.
4 . Evaluat ion of I nterna 1 Management Controls
The fourth step in the internal management control
process is to evaluate the event cycle by using the
documentation. This evaluation should help the reviewer
decide if the internal control system is sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance against waste, loss,
unauthorized use or misappropriation. This evaluation can
also determine whether the internal control system meets the
requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity
Act and OMB Circular A-123.
The manner in which this is done is to first
ascertain the control objectives for the event cycle. If the
control objectives are achieved, the potential for the
occurrence of waste, loss, unauthorized use or
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misappropriation is significantly decreased. Next, the
control objectives for an event cycle should be written.
This documentation should be reviewed to determine whether
the list of objectives for each cycle is complete, logical,
and relevant to the event cycle. If the control objectives
are not adequately documented, such documentation should
be developed and maintained as part of the overall
documentation of internal controls. Third, the relationship
between this, the prior task, and the inherent risks in an
event cycle cannot be overemphasized. Control objectives
are established because a risk of loss exists; internal
management control techniques are implemented to prevent the
specific loss from occurring.
Another important area during this step is to
identify whether there are any internal control techniques
that are excessive, thereby creating inefficiencies and
unnecessary costs.
The final results of this process should identify
those internal controls which require testing, the absence of
controls that should be corrected, control objectives for
which control techniques are not adequate and system
corrections that must be made and control techniques that
are unnecessary and can be eliminated.
5 . Test inq of Internal Controls
This is the final step in the review process and is
used to evaluate if the controls are functioning as
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required. This step is similar to an auditor's compliance
test. It may be done by selecting a sample of transactions
and reviewing the documentation for those transactions
to determine compliance with the related internal control.
In addition, observing the controls functioning and
interviewing personnel involved can be extremely useful.
If control techniques are not functioning properly, the
reviewer should evaluate if there is a compensating
control. The reviewer should note any other techniques which
might also compensate for the control in question. The
review should provide documentation for any control
weaknesses that were uncovered and possible corrective
actions for the weaknesses.
6 . Report inq the Results of I nternal Management Control
Reviews
After completing the internal management control
reviews, the results are summarized and reported on. Two
types of reports are prepared. The first report provides
management of the program information concerning the
internal control weaknesses within the system and possible
corrections. The first report includes material weaknesses
in internal accounting and administrative controls and a
schedule for their correction. Also, material weaknesses
identified and corrected during the year are included in the
first report as accomplishments. The first report is
basically an internal document to be used by the individual
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command to correct any identified weaknesses. Any
recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of the program should be included. The second report
contains a listing identifying material weaknesses in
internal accounting and administrative control of
significance to the President and the Congress, and gives
the agency head the required information necessary to
support the agency head's statement. The second report must
be made available to the public unless there is an area of
the report that is judged to be classified.
F. SCHEDULING AND TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
DOD Directive 5010. 38A requires that a formal follow-up
system be established to record and track internal
management control deficiencies from any source, schedule
corrective actions with completion dates, and provide
assistance for the development of plans for implementation
of the corrections. The recommended corrective actions of
the internal control reviews should be reviewed for possible
implementation on a timely basis by the functional area
managers. Although no specific penalties are levied for not
taking corrective actions, the administrative controls of an
activity, if properly functioning, generally have an effect
on employee awareness of individual responsibility and
provide some sort of assurance that the failure to perform





OPNAVINST 5200. 25A (ref.6:p.4) requires that quality
control shall be exercised at all levels of command to
ensure that the objectives of this program are achieved.
Specifically, Navy activities are required to:
1. Ensure internal control training is provided
2. Vulnerability assessments and management control
reviews are performed adequately
3. Required reports are prepared accurately and
submitted on time
4. Establish a formal follow-up system for monitoring
actions to significant and/or systemic weaknesses
5. Establish a system of testing corrective actions to
significant and/or systemic weaknesses.
H. CONCLUSION
The process of evaluating internal control systems has
been explained in this chapter. Personnel who have received
training in internal management control reviews should be
able to implement this system. However, the Navy has not
been completely successful in implementing this process. The
implementation problems encountered by the Navy and the
solutions the Navy has come up with to solve these problems
will be covered in the next chapters.
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IV. INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
A. HISTORY OF THE NAVY'S INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM
Once the OMB Circular A-123 and DOD guidelines were
issued, it was up to the DON to implement an internal
control program of their own to satisfy the requirements of
the FMFIA.
The Navy's first internal control instruction,
SECNAVINST 5200.35, Internal Control in the Department of
the Navy, was issued on 29 July 1983. This instruction
incorporated the original versions of Circular A-123 and DOD
guidance, as well as the FMFIA within DON. The instruction
also established the Navy's own program to develop,
maintain, review and improve internal control systems to
ensure resources are efficiently and effectively managed.
In addition, procedures for vulnerability assessments and
management control reviews were provided.
The initial responsibility for implementing the
program was assigned to the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management (ASN (FM)).
One problem with this first instruction was that there was
no central focal point for the Chief of Naval Operations'
(CNO) office to coordinate subordinate commands inputs. This
led to some confusion by Naval activities on exactly how to
implement the program at the local level because of no
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detailed guidance from the CNO level. In fact, it was not
until almost two years later in 1985, at the insistence of
the ASN(FM), that the CNO established an office and assigned
responsibility for the Navy's internal control program. The
role of the CNO ' s office is explained below.
The SECNAVINST was updated and reissued on 17 May 1985.
This revision provided updated fundamental policy guidance
and the basic management philosophy of the DON Internal
Control Program.
The CNO and the ASN ( FM ) have different roles with
regard to the program. The role of the CNO's office is
detailed in OPNAVINST 5200. 25A (ref.6:p.5). This instruction
was issued 6 January 1986 and assigns responsibility for the
Navy's Internal Control Program to the Assistant Vice Chief
of Naval Operations ( AVCNO ) (OP-09B). The AVCNO provides the
ASN (FM) with reports and statements required to satisfy the
requirements of the FMFIA. The AVCNO is also responsible for
promulgating field guidance, developing procedures,
establishing reporting requirements, maintaining an
assessable unit inventory, monitoring compliance, directing
management control reviews, following up on specific
weaknesses assigning responsibility for correction of Navy-
wide specific, significant and systemic weaknesses,
evaluating corrective actions and coordinating all training
requirements relating to the internal control program.
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The ASN (FM) role, under the Office of the Comptroller
of the Navy (NAVCOMPT), is really twofold. First, NAVCOMPT
is responsible for the maintenance of their internal control
policy instruction on internal control and preparation of
NAVCOMPT reports based on input from NAVCOMPT components on
the status of the Navy's accounting systems internal
controls. More importantly, NAVCOMPT is responsible for
writing the Secretary of the Navy's annual compliance
statement to the Secretary of Defense by consolidating all
upper echelon DON commands such as CNO, Commandant of the
Marine Corps and all the Secretariat level offices' annual
compliance statements. In preparing the Secretary of the
Navy's annual statement, NAVCOMPT extracts all material
weaknesses that have Navy-wide application from the
individual compliance statements they receive.
B. FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY
DON is a large decentralized organization that
accomplishes its mission through the use of a chain of
command
.
The financial management organization structure within
DON has at its head the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management (ASN (FM)). The ASN (FM) is responsible
for all matters related to the financial management of the
DON including budgeting, accounting, disbursing, financing,
progress and statistical reporting and auditing. Hence, the
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ASN (FM) is the Navy's chief of accounting information
systems
.
The DON has fourteen major accounting systems that meet
the GAO definition of adequate accounting systems.
Currently, only one of these systems is in compliance with
the DOD Accounting Manual procedures. For example, the
Navy's pay and disbursing system (JUMPS) was disapproved by
GAO because there were too many errors in the system.
The Navy recognizes that there are major deficiencies in
its accounting systems. However, the Navy does have a plan to
bring all its accounting systems into substantial compliance
with prescribed OMB and Comptroller General principles and
standards. This plan is called the DON Strategic Financial
Management Master Plan and details the systems, deficiencies
and corrective actions.
Some of the major deficiencies identified in the Navy's
accounting systems through the management control review
process include:
1. Data inaccuracy and incompleteness
2. Information does not meet user needs
3. System is not under full general ledger control
4. Systems do not have adequate internal controls
5. Systems are inefficient, labor intensive and costly
6. Systems do not have adequate audit trails
7. There is no uniform chart of accounts
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Each of these deficiencies cause Navy managers problems
in trying to analyze their operations and deciding how to
control, conserve, protect and use their resources.
The FMFIA has made the Navy focus on getting their
accounting systems in order since each accounting system
must be reviewed and identified deficiencies corrected. One
of the major reasons the Navy felt that they needed to get
their accounting systems in order are the possible
consequences of reporting the accounting systems as
deficient. The possible consequences or penalties of
reporting deficiences are the budget implications and strong
managerial leverage that can be applied. There have been
recent efforts to reduce the Navy's budget because of
internal control weaknesses.
C. EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL MANAGER'S FINANCIAL INTEGRITY ACT
The major effect of the FMFIA on the DON was to provide
the Navy with a significant impetus to improve management
control and accountability by focusing attention on system
problems. To this end the FMFIA has shown some success and
the Navy has demonstrated a commitment to strengthen its
systems
.
However, the initial Navy reaction to the FMFIA and the
internal control program was negative. There was significant
resistance by management when tasked to perform
vulnerability assessments and management control reviews. A
number of managers felt that the program was requiring them
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to do what auditors did, in that managers were in effect
auditing themselves. This negative attitude toward the
program by senior line managers was and still is a major
stumbling block to effective implementation of the program.
The positive aspects of the FMFIA are that first, the
Navy has taken action to establish internal control
evaluation procedures. Within the last two years, the DON
has established and clarified a number of written procedures
to guide activities in implementing a satisfactory internal
control program.
Second, the Navy has identified and corrected material
weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses, however, are long-
standing problems which take time to fully correct, and the
solutions are not always easy.
Third, as a result of the FMFIA, the Navy has also
identified and corrected a number of weaknesses, which
individually are not considered to be material in lost
money, time, etc. However, these weaknesses usually involved
failure to comply with established policies and procedures,
and collectively are important since failure to correct




The information gathering for this thesis included
review of the published GAO audits and other studies, plus
DOD and DON instructions relevant to the internal control
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program. In addition and more importantly, a telephone
survey was conducted which asked the interviewees what kind
of implementation problems they had experienced with regard
to implementing the requirements of the FMFIA and internal
control program at their organizational level.
The interviewees consisted of personnel from the Office
of the Navy Comptroller, the Navy Accounting and Finance
Center, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in
Chief, U.S.Atlantic Fleet, the Commander Naval Surface
Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the Chief of Naval Education and
Training and the Naval Audit Service.
These commands were selected because each of them has a
direct impact on the implementation process and most have
subordinate commands to whom they provide internal control
guidance
.
The telephone interviews were conducted with twelve
individuals who had some responsibility for the internal
control program at these activities. The procedure used
during the interviews was to explore the history of the
implementation process at their commands and then ask what
specific implementation problems they had experienced with
the program. Each implementation problem identified during
the interviews was then further investigated to determine
whether or not this problem appeared to be a Navy-wide
problem. The interviewees were also asked what solutions to
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their implementation problems they had arrived at and what
improvements they would recommend.
E. DON INTERNAL CONTROL PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
The internal management control review process
previously described would seem to be a relatively simple
process that, if followed carefully, would produce adequate
results and satisfy the requirements of OMB Circular A-123
and the FMFIA. Nevertheless, the Navy has experienced
numerous implementation problems which have been the source
of tremendous frustration for Navy managers. The first list
of identified implementation problems are derived from
published GAO reports (ref. 7) and a study completed by the
President's Council on Management Improvement (ref. 8) and
include
:
1. Paperwork and workload burden
2. Inadequate basis for reporting
3. No follow-up or tracking system for reporting
corrected internal control deficiencies
4. Accounting systems did not conform to GAO requirements
Each of these areas will be examined more closely.
1 . Paperwork and workload burden
The President's Council on Management Improvement
highlighted the paperwork and workload burden of the program
in their October 1985 report (ref. 8:p.l). Two of the major
findings from this report were that : 1) a substantial time
and paper burden was created in the FMFIA's implementation;
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and 2) similar vulnerability assessment results could have
been accomplished through a simpler process with less paper.
In GAO ' s December 1985 audit of the
FMFIA (ref.9:p.54) GAO wrote that a common concern
surrounding the Act has centered on documentation of systems
and the view that the evaluation process has become a
burdensome paper exercise. Additionally, the House Committee
on Government Operations expressed concern that some agency
officials believed that implementation of the Act had
accomplished little beyond adding to the paperwork burden.
The Committee concluded that if managers adopt the view that
the implementation process is merely a burdensome paper
exercise, this attitude will hamper efforts to achieve
substantial improvement in the management of the Federal
Government
.
The President's Council on Management Improvement
report found that the vulnerability assessment process was
the most frequently criticized process. They found that
managers believed that this process was required to be
performed too frequently. In addition, some managers thought
the vulnerability assessment process could be done by
relying on information produced from existing management
control evaluation and reporting processes.
Another major problem is staffing. Although the
individual managers were responsible for reviewing their
programs, there were no personnel billets identified to
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coordinate the command programs or train the managers on the
proper procedures. The Internal Control Program coordinators
were generally found in the internal review organization or
given to a junior officer as a collateral duty, and usually
the program coordinators had no knowledge or experience
in the area of internal control systems.
2 . Inadequate bas is for report inq
One problem the Navy has encountered during
implementation is an inadequate basis for reporting their
internal control systems as being in compliance with
prescribed standards. The Navy did not know how general
prescribed standards would apply to their operations and
their systems that were under development. The GAO audit
(ref. 9:p.35) reported that agencies did not know if
controls were adequate because their internal control
programs had not yet evolved to the point that they provided
an adequate basis to determine that the Navy's systems of
internal controls, taken as a whole, met the requirements of
the Act. In addition, there had been difficulty in
identifying systemic internal control problems.
3 . No_ f ol low-up or track inq system for report i nq
corrected inter na 1 control de f ic iencies
Another problem area noted by the GAO was that most
Navy activities had not established required formal tracking
and follow-up systems to monitor and ensure that internal
control deficiencies were promptly corrected. GAO stated
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that the Navy could progress significantly in its future
FMFIA effort by implementing the required tracking and
follow-up systems throughout the Navy (ref. 7:p.22 ). Two
major reasons given for the lack of a system were no
guidance on exactly how to set up a system and the reporting
requirements under the system. Given the quality of the
initial implementation guidance, these reasons appear valid.
4 . Account ing systems d id not conform to GAP
requirements
As stated earlier, only one of the fourteen Navy
accounting systems is in compliance with DOD Accounting
Manual procedures. The GAO audit on the Navy's
implementation progress (ref. 7:p.G ) stated that the Navy
did not evaluate and test in operation any of their
accounting systems, did not adequately coordinate internal
control reviews with accounting system evaluations, and had
not established an adequate system to track accounting
system deficiencies.
F. RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS
The specific implementation problems listed below are
derived from the results of the interviews with the commands
listed above, and represent the interpretations or
perceptions of the interviewees on the effect of the
implementation problems on the overall effectiveness of the
internal control process. The major implementation problems
identified in the interviews include:
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1. Decentralization o£ the Navy
2. Manager's resistance to participate
3. Lack of procedural guidance
4. Definition of an assessable unit
5. No standard inventory of assessable units
6. Vulnerability assessments less than required
7. Lack of manager training
8. Paperwork burden
Each of these areas will now be examined.
1
.
Decentralization of the Navy
The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
process is, in general, a very cumbersome process. This is
particularly a major problem for large decentralized
organizations such as the Navy. The paperwork aspects of the
program are compounded by the need to promulgate the program
down through the Navy chain of command to the lowest
managerial level. The lowest managerial level is then
required to complete the required management control reviews
in a short time frame to satisfy the reporting requirements
up the chain of command. This layering effect can sometimes
involve five or more levels, which can slow the overall
process and make the manager on the bottom of the chain of
command sometimes perform his work in a crisis mode.
2 Manager ' s res istance to part ic ipate
With the introduction of any new system to an
organization there will always be some internal resistance
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to change that is normal human reaction. The Navy was no
exception when it tried to implement their internal control
program. Each interview conducted referred to the problem of
manager resistance to participate in the program. There were
several reasons given for this problem. First and foremost,
the managers believed that by reporting and documenting
their internal control weaknesses, they were in effect
putting themselves "on report". Managers thought that the
program was making them into auditors. Secondly, managers
believed the enormous time and effort imposed in completing
the process was not well spent and could be used on more
productive work. Thirdly, most line managers viewed this as
a "staff" problem and, therefore, felt that they did not
need to participate because they believed that internal
controls only applied to accounting and financial controls
and not administrative controls. Finally, if the command's
internal control program coordinator was successful in
getting the organization's managers to participate, the
sketchy or nonexistant guidance and training from the
headquarters level caused a lot of managers to call the
program a failure before it had a chance to be implemented.
3 . Lack of procedural guidance
A major problem for the Navy was that procedural
guidance on implementing certain areas of the FMFIA was
inconsistent and overlapping. Some interviewees believed
that the entire process on how the Navy wanted to implement
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the program was not completely thought out prior to issuance
of the first SECNAV instruction. In addition, the Navy had
not completely resolved who was going to be involved in the
reporting cycle, how to perform vulnerability assessments
and internal management control reviews, and realistic
training programs for managers were not ready. This led to
major confusion among all Navy commands because no one
really understood the ent ire process . Initial guidance was




De f ini t ion of an assessable unit
The major problem addressed in the interviews was
that there was not a consistent definition of what an
assessable unit was and how detailed the assessable unit had
to be. This problem ties back into the problem of poor
guidance. Some activities segmented their organizations into
assessable units based on their organization charts (e.g.,
Supply, Operations, Administration, etc.) while some
segmented these into smaller units (e.g., Supply was
segmented into purchasing, receiving, shipping and
d isburs ing )
.
5 Np_ standard inventory of assessable units
This is a follow-on problem from the above
discussion. The point here is that because the Navy had no
standard inventory of assessable units, it had a problem
directing which areas Navy commands should review on a
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systemic basis, because some commands had not segmented
their commands in the same way as other commands.
6
.
Vulnerabi 1 i ty assessments less than required
The GAO audit noted that agencies have devoted
considerable resources to making vulnerability assessments,
and the vulnerability of thousands of operations have been
assessed. Nevertheless, these efforts have not resulted in
reliable and useful information to managers.
In the interview with the Naval Audit Service
(ref.10), the problem of lack of good vulnerability
assessments at the commands that the Naval Audit Service
had reviewed was discussed. A major problem in this area
was that managers had a preconceived judgment over what the
vulnerability of a program should be. This judgment was used
instead of the process discussed earlier to identify the
controls already in place that could reduce the
vulnerability of that area. As discussed before,
vulnerability assessments are to be a preliminary analysis
by the manager on where internal control strengths and
weaknesses may exist in their programs and on the
susceptibility of their programs to fraud, waste or abuse.
7 Lack of manager training
All interviewees agreed on this point. If the entire
internal control process is to work and the requirements of
the FMFIA are to be met, then it is vital that all managers
receive training in the internal control process.
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Unfortunately, there was a poor definition of what training
was required and, therefore, the quality of training was
unsatisfactory. Instructing and training managers must be
performed to provide them with a better understanding of
what was required of them. The consensus of opinion was that
if all the managers were trained in the process, then the
reviews and reports produced would be of higher quality and
the Navy would have a better basis for reporting.
8 . Paperwork burden
Most interviewees had some comment on the paperwork
burden of the program as it related to manager resistance to
the program. The problem pointed out in the interviews was
that their managers had a firm belief that the entire
internal management control process was requiring them to
spend already scarce resources documenting a lot of
information that they did not feel was particularly useful
to them. Most managers felt that documenting their systems
should produce information that could assist them in
developing corrective actions and planning future work. The
interviewees noted that this type of comment from managers
was common and generally came from frustrated managers who
had resisted the program from the outset.
G. CONCLUSION
The Navy is well aware of all of the problems mentioned
above. Most of the problems identified during the
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interviews and studies result from the fact that the Navy's
internal control program has not yet fully evolved into an
effective program.
Some of the major findings included in this chapter
were the manager's resistance to participate in the
program, the paperwork and workload burden, lack of good
procedural guidance, and no follow-up system for internal
control deficiencies. The Navy recognizes that several
improvements are still required to achieve a quality
internal control program.
The next chapter will describe some of the Navy's
solutions to the identified implementation problems.
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V. NAVY'S SOLUTIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The GAO audits of the Navy's implementation of the FMFIA
have commented on the Navy's implementation progress. The
GAO noted that the "Navy had made progress in developing and
implementing its internal control evaluation program and in
reviewing its accounting systems for conformance with the
Comptroller General's requirements" (ref. 7:p.2). In
addition, "the Navy increased its organizational and
functional coverage; conducted more assessments of the risks
of fraud, waste, and abuse; completed an inventory of its
accounting systems; and evaluated two major accounting
systems and two subsystems" (ref. 7:p.2).
The following are areas in which the Navy has made
progress in correcting implementation problems. The
solutions described below have been gathered from the
interviews with major Navy commands.
1. Updating internal control program guidance
2. Using other sources of information to substitute
for Internal Control Reviews
3. Integrating audit plans into the Management Control
review process
4. Improving manager training
5. Writing an Internal Control Review plan based on
vulnerability assessments
6. Internal Control Information System
A detailed description of each of these areas is
presented below.
B. NAVY'S ACTIONS TO SOLVE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
1
.
Improving I nternal Control Guidance
NAVCOMPT and CNO recognized that several
improvements were needed to achieve a quality program and
emphasized consistent, good quality management control
reviews, particularly documenting the control process and
testing control techniques.
NAVCOMPT and CNO established and clarified a number
of written procedures to guide commands and activities in
implementing a satisfactory internal control program. Some
of these changes include revising the vulnerability
assessment process from a 2 to a 5 year cycle and providing
more direction on specific areas to review.
2 Us ing Other Sources of I nf ormat ion to Subst i tute
for Internal Control Reviews
A substantial portion of management's resistance to
the program came from managers who believed that the
management control review process was duplicating the
efforts of inspection and audit teams. The internal control
program process required that the manager review his areas
of responsibility to identify weaknesses and document the
entire process. At the same time, the same manager was
being audited or inspected in the identical area. Most
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managers felt that this was a tremendous duplication of
effort and laid the blame on the management control process.
Recognizing the problem, the new OPNAVINST allows
Navy activities to use other management control activities
such as management studies, audit reports, inspections and
reviews to assess controls and substitute these for internal
management control reviews. This solution was implemented
because most agencies believe that audit reports, management
studies and command inspections are an integral part of an
effective management control system.
3 . I nteqrat inq aud it plans i nto the management control
review process
The Naval Audit Service has a number of functional
area audit plans that are used by auditors when auditing
Naval activities. These functional area audit plans serve as
general guidelines for the auditors to check for compliance
with directives and procedures. The audit plans do not
include every possible area that can be reviewed in the
functional area, but are the minimum effort required by the
auditor. The reason for this is because the Audit Service
wants their auditors to have some degree of flexibility when
reviewing a particular area to investigate additional areas.
The Navy is attempting to integrate these audit
plans into the management control review process. This will
allow activity managers to use these audit plans to aid them
in performing their internal management control reviews.
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The Navy hopes that each activity will use these
audit plans as a baseline to possibly develop checklists of
their own that can be tailored to specific management
control problem areas. However, there are pros and cons to
using this approach. Checklists are a management tool that
can be used effectively, but they can also be misused.
Checklists can be effective in ensuring that important
review areas are not forgotten. They can serve as a reminder
to managers that they need to ensure adequate review is
given in each particular area. However, usually checklists
are not all inclusive. Managers have a tendency to review
only those areas that are included on the checklist, thereby
potentially missing areas that need closer management
review. What the checklist does provide is a point of
reference; but the checklist does have the potential for
misuse if the manager relies solely on the checklist to
complete his management control reviews.
4 . Improving Manager Training
Lack of or no training for the manager was a serious
problem the Navy needed to solve if the program was to be
successful. Two areas were developed by the Navy as
solutions to the problem. DOD disseminated a self-
instructional course on conducting internal control reviews.
The Navy believes that when this course is combined with
better headquarters guidance and quality assurance
techniques at the local level, it will achieve the desired
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improvements because proper training will afford managers
the knowledge required to perform the required tasks within
the program and hopefully achieve better results. Some
interviewees, however, found the self -instruct ional course
to be too general to be of any use.
Probably one of the best improvements to the program
is the internal control program indoctrination that
prospective Commanding Officers (PCO) and prospective
Executive Officers (PXO) receive. The goal is to indoctrinate
as many PCOs and PXOs as possible on the internal control
program prior to reporting to their new assignments. By
making these officers aware of the internal control program
and the importance of establishing and maintaining an
effective internal control program, it is hoped that
internal controls can become a mindset among line managers.
Most interviewees believed that this improvement of
increasing the consciousness of Navy managers to internal
controls will go much further in the Navy's effective
implementation of the program, because if Commanding
Officers and Executive Officers take an active interest in
the program, it can be successful.
5. Wr i t ing an Internal Control Review Plan Based on
Vulnerabi li ty Assessments
One problem area previously mentioned was that the
internal control reviews were sometimes duplicating the
efforts of recently completed audits, inspections and other
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reviews. To solve this duplication of effort problem, the
CNO, in conjunction with the Naval Audit Service, is writing
a five year internal control review plan based on the
results of the Navy's vulnerability assessments. This five
year plan will be meshed with the Naval Audit Service's five
year audit plan to determine which areas will be reviewed by
the Naval Audit Service, and will satisfy the requirement of
completing a management control review. The resulting audit
plan and internal control review plan will be reviewed by
the AVCNO and the Naval Audit Service, and will be
prioritized based upon the results of the Navy's
vulnerability assessments. Joint approval of these plans
will be accomplished by both activities. This is a change
that is allowed under the recent revision to OMB Circular
A-123. By merging the internal control plan and audit plan,
the Navy hopes there will be a reduction in the duplication
of effort. In addition, if this meshing is successful, the
Navy believes that the program implementation will be
improved due to increased functional area coverage, a
greater number of assessments can be conducted and, best of
all, there will be improved identification and correction of
internal control weaknesses.
6 . Internal Control Information System
The Navy has developed an innovative alternative to
the traditional approach to accounting systems evaluations.
The traditional approach is weak in a number of significant
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areas. First, the traditional approach has often failed to
encompass the entire system looking only at individual
segments of systems. Second, qualitative measurements of
specific threats facing a system and the resulting risk
reductions achieved by individual internal controls have not
been obtained. Lastly, the traditional approach has not
allowed for cost-benefit analysis of the merit of specific
internal controls.
As a specific action to overcome these shortcomings,
NAVCOMPT has developed the Internal Control Information
System (ICIS) (ref. 11). The ICIS is a subset of NAVCOMPT '
s
Consolidated Systems Evaluation Program (CSE). CSE is a
comprehensive approach to accounting systems reviews to
determine the adequacy of an accounting system's conformance
to regulations, data processing soundness, functional
soundness, and internal control soundness.
ICIS is a computer/software supported approach to
internal control review and improvement which addresses each
of the shortcomings of the traditional approach to
accounting systems evaluations. The ICIS reviews entire
systems instead of individual segments and develops and
addresses specific threats, associated dollar risks, and risk
reduction achieved by individual controls.
ICIS is not a checklist approach to internal control
evaluation. It is an approach which evaluates the threat and
potential dollar impact in each area. Expected threat
occurrence rates are determined and all controls and their
risk reduction are computed. This procedure produces a
listing which shows initial exposure, risk reduction
achieved by specific controls and the remaining risk after
all controls are considered. This allows the manager to look
at each control with regard to its cost-benefit. In
addition, the ICIS allows managers to use sensitivity
analysis to explore the impact of adding, deleting or
modifying internal controls.
Finally, the ICIS appears to be an efficient,
innovative approach to accounting systems reviews. It is
certainly a step in the right direct ion, and it is hoped that
this system will prove to be effective in improving reviews
of internal controls in the Navy's accounting systems.
C. OTHER IMPROVEMENTS
Two other improvements deserve mention here. The
President's Council on Management Improvement's report
identified the following two areas of potential improvement
to the implementation process. The Council looked across
different government agencies to see what they were doing in
relation to accomplishing the requirements of the FMFIA. The
Navy is working on the following two areas.
1 . Deve loping a Short Form for Management Control
R e v i e ws
The Department of the Army has developed a checklist
approach to the internal management control review. The Army
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moved in this direction because of the extensive amount of
Army regulations (not unlike the Navy) that specify how
functions should be performed so more standardization
was needed. This was accomplished by adjusting
responsibility for internal controls around functional
managers and by moving to a standard checklist.
The checklists include identification of the task
under review, the associated risk, control objectives, and
control techniques. The checklists are designed to aid the
operating managers in determining if internal controls are
operating properly within their area of responsibility.
Operating managers use the checklists to test internal
controls and provide feedback and suggestions to functional
managers
.
One interviewee stated that the Navy has done some
preliminary work in this area, but development of the Navy
checklists has been slow because of the nature of the Navy's
internal control reviews are so diverse. Designing a concise
checklist has been difficult. Some commands were trying to
develop local checklists tailored to their specific
commands. Further investigation by the Navy into developing
management control review checklists appears warranted,
since it can be shown that when correctly used these




2 . Us ing a New Vulnerabi 1 i ty Assessment Form
Another area noted by the President's Council was a
vulnerability assessment short form adopted by the Federal
Highway Administration. The Navy has modified this form for
use within the DON. This form provides the manager with a
concise one page checklist designed to provide a review of
the general control environment, analysis of inherent risk
and a preliminary assessment of safeguards. Some
interviewees believe that the implementation of this new
form will be very useful to managers because it will allow
managers to reduce the time and paperwork required to
perform vulnerability assessments.
D. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE NAVY'S ACTIONS
The Navy has made some progress in implementing the
FMFIA. The Navy's efforts to develop and improve its
internal control evaluation program, albeit slow, have
proven to be relatively successful. Nevertheless, there are
still some shortcomings in the Navy's program.
First, the Navy has spent an inordinate amount of time
identifying and documenting internal control weaknesses and,
in most cases, planning and taking corrective actions.
However, the Navy has not routinely tested the corrective
actions of the internal controls to verify that these
corrective actions are being systematically implemented and
the controls are now operating as intended. The Navy needs
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to ensure routine testing of corrective actions to determine
their effectiveness.
Another shortcoming of the implementation process is
that internal control awareness in the Navy has not
completely filtered down to all applicable management
levels. The impression received throughout the interviews
was that many of the subordinate commands had not fully
implemented their own internal control programs. To
completely implement a totally effective internal control
program, the Navy must ensure that internal control systems
are implemented at all Naval activities to provide the means
for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse. The best way to
achieve this objective is to make internal controls a
mindset among Navy managers. This requires that the internal
control program evolve to be part of the management
organization of the Navy.
The Navy needs to find a way to give the line managers
more incentive to implement and maintain effective internal
control systems. The line manager must be convinced that
effective internal control systems are of greater benefit
to him than weak controls. The benefits must be explained
to him in terms that he can understand. For example, if the
line manager can be shown that lack of a specific control
is draining his resources and requiring him to forego
meeting mission requirements (such as less ship underway
time or flight hours, or not enough warfare training
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exercises to enable his crew to become more battle
proficient), then effective internal control systems can
potentially be implemented and line managers will begin
to associate good internal control systems with increased
readiness. This effort will continue to be a major challenge
for top Navy management, because getting this type of
incentive across to all Navy managers is difficult due to
the decentralized nature of the Navy's organization.
Another shortcoming noted is that the Navy needs to
concentrate on the results of the program. Strengthening
internal controls and accounting systems is the bottom line
of the FMF1A. The Navy needs to concentrate more on the
substance of the evaluation process and less on
documentation and report language to achieve the overall
objective of improving internal controls and accounting
systems
.
Finally, the Navy's organization needs to investigate
how it can ensure the overall effectiveness of its internal
control program. In the private sector the approach used is
the formal audit committee. This committee oversees the
various audits to ensure the overall effectiveness of the
audits the particular company receives. The members are
independent of management. This is important because it
relieves management of any pressure, perceived or otherwise,
which may impact on the effectiveness of the particular
audit. The Navy may investigate use of an inter-disciplinary
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body apart from NAVCOMPT and AVCNO to integrate the various
internal control concepts and definitions and to develop a
common reference point. This body's guidance would move to
develop a standard against which other activities can judge
the effectiveness of their internal control programs, and
thus help other Naval activities improve their internal
control systems. This oversight committee could be charged
with overseeing the financial reporting process and the
Navy's internal control system. It could also independently
ensure that the Navy was making satisfactory progress toward
improving systemic internal control weaknesses and further
enhance the Navy's ability to report their accounting
systems and internal controls in compliance with the FMFIA.
E. CONCLUSION
The Navy is working to strengthen its internal
management control program. While progress has been made by
the Navy to correct some of the implementation deficiencies
and smooth out the rough edges, there is still a lot of work
that the Navy needs to do before it has an effective
internal management control program and more importantly a
system of internal controls that will meet the intent and
the requirements of the FMFIA.
The last chapter provides a summary along with some
recommendations and conclusions on what additional actions
the Navy could possibly undertake to make further progress
in the implementation of the Act.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether the
Navy has successfully implemented the Federal Managers'
Financial Integrity Act of 1982; to determine if the Navy
has resolved their implementation problems, and if the Navy
has come up with any innovative ideas to make the management
control process more efficient and effective.
This thesis consolidates and highlights information on
the Navy's implementation problems and their efforts to
improve their internal control problems. After the initial
historical background of internal control program
development in the Federal Government, an explanation of the
current internal control evaluation system was covered. This
chapter was presented to give the reader an appreciation of
the depth of information and workload required by the
current internal control process.
The history of the Navy's Internal Control Program, the
Navy's financial management structure and accounting systems
weaknesses, and the implementation problems the Navy has
experienced in implementing their internal control program
was then developed and discussed. The information in this
chapter was designed to show the reader the historical
difficulties encountered by the Navy in organizing their
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program, the type of organizational structure the Navy
operates under and present the implementation problems
encountered by the Navy in detail.
The Navy's solutions to the implementation problems and
the shortcomings of those solutions were then covered in
detail. The reader should hopefully obtain from this chapter
an appreciation of the Navy's efforts in correcting their
implementation problems. Additionally, it should be apparent
to the reader how much further the Navy's program needs to
evolve before it can be judged as being completely
entrenched in the Navy's organization.
The generalization of the results of this study are
limited, given that only a few activities were able to be
interviewed. Nevertheless, since the activities interviewed
were senior Navy echelon commands, the results of this study-
could be extended to other Naval activities.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the research conducted for this thesis, one
conclusion reached was that the concept of internal control
in the Navy has progressed significantly over time since the
program's inception. It has grown from merely a means to
detect and prevent fraud to include the means of effectively
performing a mission or realizing an objective.
The FMFIA process has produced a heightened awareness of
the importance of internal controls at all management levels
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and has reiterated management's responsibility for
establishing and testing those controls.
The Navy's efforts to fully implement the FMFIA are far
from complete. Although the basic framework for an effective
internal control program has been established within the
Navy, the research conducted indicates further
implementation must be done before the Navy's program can
provide an adequate basis for determining that internal
controls, taken as a whole, comply with the objectives of
the Act. The Navy has recognized the deficiencies in the
implementation process and has moved to correct these system
de f iciencies .
In my opinion, the largest obstacle the Navy needs to
overcome to make implementation of internal controls
successful is the line manager's resistance to participate
in the program. This problem is compounded by the
decentralized nature of the Navy's organization. As stated
before, the Navy's internal control program needs to evolve
to be part of the management organization. How is the Navy
to achieve this evolution? My opinion is that the Navy
needs to go back to basics and have managers assess
themselves by looking at what they are assigned to do,
evaluate the results against whether or not they are doing
it, and if there is a difference between the two, then take
the appropriate corrective actions. Giving the line manager
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more incentive to have strong internal control systems is
also extremely important.
Unfortunately, this simplistic solution will only work
where the Navy already has good managers in place.
Implementation of effective internal control programs has
not been a major problem where good managers existed. Where
poor managers exist, internal control programs will tend not
to be successful. If this is the case then increased
scrutiny over these poor managers will be required to ensure
the objectives of the internal control program are achieved.
Other implementation problems and solutions are
procedural in nature and the solutions will eventually make
the Navy's internal control program more effective.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
What will be the future of the Navy's internal control
program? Although a number of Navy managers probably thought
that this was just another bureaucratic program that would
die away, my view is that the Navy's internal control
program with the backing of the FMFIA is here to stay. The
future of a successful program, however, will depend on a
number of factors that have been previously discussed. Since
the program is not going away, it is in the best interest of
the Navy to make the program work for the Navy and improve
its internal controls and accounting systems instead of
making the Navy work for the program.
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The following actions ace recommended:
1. The Navy needs to continue to incorporate the
internal management control process into the overall
management process. This would result in greater
support for the internal control process and would
relieve duplication of reviews and tracking systems.
2. The Navy should consider reducing the paperwork
burden, and reduce staff days required to maintain the
process by further developing checklists to help
managers perform internal control reviews. These
checklists should include the minimum essential
controls needed to comply with the internal control
standards. These checklists would serve to reduce the
program down to a simple, manageable level.
3. The Navy needs to continue to gain the support of
senior line managers in relation to the internal
control process through incentives in terms the line
manager can relate to. This is a critical area because
without these senior manager's support the internal
control process will not succeed. The Navy's efforts
in indoctrinating PCOs and PXOs will make this much
easier .
4. The Navy needs to continue its efforts to implement an
effective tracking and follow-up system. Such systems
are essential to monitor and ensure that actions
developed to correct internal control deficiencies arc
7 6
completed. The Navy needs to establish a central area
such 'as the AVCNO for reporting correction status of
weaknesses and streamline follow-up for all identified
weaknesses
.
5. As a related recommendation, the Navy could establish
an improved implementation feedback program. This,
along with a system of lessons learned, could ensure
that implementation problems are identified for
evaluation and serve as a guide for managers to
determine the actual status of their implementation
process
.
6. To fully implement an effective internal control
program, the Navy needs to develop more effective
manager training which supports the program and gives
a set of guidelines for the establishment and reviews
of internal controls.
7. The Navy needs to continue to focus on alternative
ways to complete the management control review process
which are most cost-beneficial. The Navy has moved
closer in this direction by now allowing the use of
audits, inspections and other reviews to serve the
purpose of management control reviews.
8. As a long range goal, the Navy should study the
feasibility of establishing a computer network for
reporting requirements of the Act. Automating the
documentation of vulnerability assessments and
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management control reviews could go a long way toward
implementing recommendations 4 and 5.
The Navy needs to investigate the use of an
oversight committee, possibly including outsiders, to
integrate internal control concepts and definitions
and to develop a common reference point. This body
could help ensure the Navy was making satisfactory
progress toward improving internal control weaknesses
and enhance the Navy's ability to meet the
requirements of the FMFIA.
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